Whit Merrifield Continues Trend of Safety over Upside in Roster Construction

Whit Merrifield used to be a really solid baseball player. He came to the major late as a 9th round pick out of college who spent a bunch of time in the minors. At his peak he was a second baseman who had above average offense due to great contact rates, and great speed (which he may not have always used well). The Royals eventually shipped him to Toronto, and now he has landed with the Phillies on a 1 year deal that is functionally worth $8 million (there is a team option year, but it seems exceedingly farfetched). He will presumably take the spot of either Cristian Pache or Jake Cave on the opening day roster, and will likely be a better player than whoever he replaces.

There are however a myriad of problems with this situation when you start to peel back the layers. The first is that Merrifield is described as a utility or super utility player. Merrifield has spent 8730.2 innings in the field in his big league career, 5826.1 were at second, 1287 in right, 835.2 in left, and 652.1 in center. That leaves just 129.1 innings in the rest of the infield (first and third, with one inning on the mound). He cannot play center anymore, so that leaves him with just second base and the outfield corners. Depending on your defensive metrics of choice he is either slipping defensively, or already slipped. The Phillies are reportedly going to try him at third and first this preseason, but it is hard to see that as more than in game emergency versatility.

Then there is his bat. Once an above average hitter, Merrifield has posted an OPS+ of 93, 90, and 94 respectively (89, 88, 93 wRC+). DRC+ is a bit kinder at 95, 106, and 96, but it is still a 20 point drop from his peak. He has never walked at a good rate (outside of 2018), so his value has been tied up in contact. His strikeout rate has increased each of the last 3 seasons as his swing rate has increased, particularly chasing out of the zone, and his in zone contact rate has slipped from elite to just good. The real hit in value has been his power. In his peak he had an ISO of .150, and over the last three years that has been .117. His average exit velocity has started to show more slipping and less stability, and his hard hit% took a real dive in 2023. He outperformed his expected stats in both average and slugging last year by sizeable margins.

All of that decline is not unexpected, and has been frankly very graceful for a player of his age and skillset. The Phillies think that playing less will help him wear down less, but there is not a lot of fountain of youth to go back to. He is entering his age 35 season, and physical decline is expected and for a player without superb physical tools outside of contact, the impact of that contact is expected to be diminished.

In both the good and bad categories, Merrifield does not have significant platoon splits. Historically he has hit LHPs better than RHPs, but last year he hit RHPs better than lefties. He can generally get a bit more power vs lefties, but he is by no means a left hand pitcher masher. He is also not a liability vs RHPs. On the positive side, this means he is not pigeon holed as a platoon partner for Marsh and in theory the Phillies could sit Rojas for a game, slide Marsh to center and put Whit in left. You also don’t have to worry about pinch hitting for him late in a game. On the other hand, he doesn’t crush left handed pitchers, and if you want a bat to come in for Marsh that either might make them think twice about bringing in a lefty or give you a big improvement over Marsh vs a lefty, he isn’t going to give you that. For the most part the Phillies roster is locked in, but in the case that Rojas (or someone else) is ineffective, or there is an injury, Whit is more useful as an everyday stop gap than building an actual impact spot.

There is also the roster implications, which in fairness were always going to be present in some form. The Phillies have locked an outfielder (Schwarber) into their DH spot. While the second baseman (Stott) and leftfielder (Marsh) are the backup shortstop and center fielder, neither is a positive defensively at the more premium position. That means that while Whit can provide some starting lineup versatile, you are still going to want to roster an actual backup infielder and possibly a backup center fielder on the bench. Whit can obviously not be optioned, Edmundo Sosa is out of options, and whatever of Cave and Pache are on the roster is out of options. The bullpen is also similarly stuck, meaning that if there is a minor injury or other need for a roster shuffle, the only players that can be sent to the minors are all the young players who are presumably in starting roles.

The money isn’t nothing either. The $8M doesn’t cause any problems on it’s own, but it moves the Phillies closer to the 3rd tax line (they are an estimated $16M from it now with potential bonuses and incentives making it murkier). The draft penalty (1st round pick moves back 10 spots) is large enough that it should factor into future decisions, and make it a larger incentive to blow past the line and not skirt it with smaller signings. Depending on the season and moves the Phillies make, the $8M may not matter, but there is a chance it reduces flexibility or makes them incur a larger prospect cost at the deadline in order to stay under the line.

If you want to defend this move, the case is that playing an infield and outfield spot is a positive thing for an inflexible bench. He has been a fairly consistent player who even in decline has had good contact skills. He gives a high floor replacement level to the bench.

My problem with the move is that it is a decent chunk of money for a player that is fairly inflexible, despite his reputation. He hasn’t had his production crater, but he has been in decline for years, and there is an inevitable time where the contact skills will erode and the impact on the ball will not justify him being in a lineup. He does not bring any of the right handed patience and on base skills that they were lacking in the postseason. His lack of impact in platoon situations and declining skillset also means it is unlikely that there is an advantage to be gained by situationally using him.

All of this isn’t a uniquely Whit Merrifield problem. All the way back to the Rodolfo Castro situation last year, the Phillies have not built their bench and roster in a way that allows them to extract value from maximizing the strengths of the players involved.